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National Intelligence Daily

Wednesday 30 July 1980

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Top Secret

CO NID 80-178JX 30 July 1980

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
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BRIEFS AND COMMENTS		
BOLIVIA: New Regime's Prospects		
Argentina's recognition on Monday of the Bol government may improve the new regime's chances for legitimacy and financial support.		25X1
The decision could induce other national ularly Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Urugua the Garcia Meza government. These nations military governments and are more likely to Bolivian military's claim that it seized point a Communist from being elected. Bolivian nations, so far seem disjnclined to	ay, to recognize s also have to accept the power to pre- ivia's Andean well as most	
Meza's claim.	-	25X1
The Argentine move and its continued port to Bolivia may also dishearten the renents. Civilian resistance now appears listered several scattered mining districts. Herne who had been expected to be elected presiduling and so far has not been able to unitance.	egime's oppo- imited to an Siles Zuazo, dent, is in	25X1
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CUBA: Castro's Speech		
President Castro apparently has decided on a lapproach toward Washington for now.	ess aggressive	25X1
The content and tone of Castro's remark the US in his annual 26 July speech were sim statements made the previous week in Nicarag ing to repudiate recent US media reports that seeking improved ties with the US, Castro im remained interested in broad-ranging talks.	nilar to his qua. By fail It Havana was	_
On past occasions when Havana had no innormalization, Castro was quick to squelch stion. In the short term, therefore, Cuba protocarry out new schemes to increase the report otherwise provoke the US.	such specula- obably will	25X1
The Castro regime is sensitive to the inactions may have on the US election campaigns strongly believes a change of administration highly unfavorable to its interests.	. Havana	25X1
Castro presented a detailed critique of lican Party platform, warning that if fulfil lead to war between the US and Latin America trast, the Cuban leader generally avoided dept President Carter's administration, virtual the refugee issue, and made no reference to ditions for negotiations with the US.	led it would be By con- enunciations ally ignored	25X1
Commenting on his visit to Nicaragua, Casserted that true revolutionary progress cagained through armed struggle. He pointed the President Allende's overthrow in Chile in 19 recent coup in Bolivia as proof that the onle formula for liberation was that used by Cuba and Grenada. Castro's strong attacks on the junta and the Guatemalan Government—and on	n only be to the late 73 and the y viable Nicaragua, Salvadoran US backing	
for these regimesindicate that Cuban suppogents in those countries will continue.	rt for insur	25/1
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USSR: Oil Production

Soviet oil production during the first half of this year averaged about 11.9 million barrels per day. Oil production from July through December will have to average almost 12.3 million barrels per day to reach the 1980 daily production goal of 12.1 million barrels. The goal could be met if 1980 production follows the pattern of the past six years, when second half output accounted for 51 percent of total annual production. Declining well productivities, sharply increased drilling requirements, transport problems resulting in shortfalls of oil-field equipment deliveries, and a serious lack of infrastructure at the new oilfields in West Siberia indicate, however, the target for 1980 will be difficult to achieve.

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